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Abstract: Recent research has shown the usefulness of social preferences for explaining be-
havior in laboratory experiments. This paper demonstrates that models of social preferences 
are particularly powerful in explaining behavior if they are embedded in a setting of heteroge-
neous actors with heterogeneous (social) preferences. For this purpose a simple model is in-
troduced that combines the basic ideas of inequity aversion, social welfare preferences, recip-
rocity and heterogeneity. This model is applied to 43 games and it can be shown that its pre-
dictive accuracy is clearly higher than that of the isolated approaches. Furthermore, it can 
explain most of the “anomalies” (the “contradictions”) that are discussed in Goeree and Holt 
(2001).  
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1. Introduction  
When we meet people for the first time in our life we often ask ourselves what kind of person 
he or she is. And it is not just a question of curiosity that we like to know what type of person 
we are acquainted with. Most often this is the central question for our decision to have further 
contact with that person. Such a way of thinking suggests that people are indeed very differ-
ent from each other and that the type of the person we are occupied with is of uttermost im-
portance. However, economic theory, by and large, ignores differences between people and 
usually assumes homogeneous preferences. Maybe economic theory misses too much of hu-
man behavior by doing so. The main purpose of this paper is to demonstrate the usefulness of 
explicitly modeling heterogeneity in preferences for explaining the behavior of subjects in 43 
laboratory experiments. Next to this we try to corroborate the relevance of social preferences 
for explaining human behavior.  
Experimental evidence makes clear that there are many games in which Nash Equilibrium 
describes people’s behavior quite well. However, there seem to be just as many other games 
in which laboratory behavior deviates from the predictions of standard game theory by a wide 
margin. Obviously, there is a need for theoretical innovations which can explain the successes 
of game theory as well as its failures. No doubt, theory has reacted to experimental evidence. 
There are several branches of new theoretical approaches that can claim to have at least partial 
success in introducing superior concepts. Dynamic evolutionary approaches1 (e.g. replicator 
dynamics) often but not always converge to Nash Equilibria. Quantal Response Equilibria in 
general and the Logit Equilibrium in particular (McKelvey and Palfrey 1995, 1998 and Go-
eree and Holt 2001) have been quite successful in explaining behavioral reactions due to pa-
rameter variations in games with identical Nash Equilibria. Finally, there is a third strand of 
research which was successful in explaining deviations from Nash Equilibrium. These are 
approaches of “other regarding” or “social” preferences. The social preferences approach can 
be divided into at least three important substrands: theories of intentional reciprocity (Rabin 
1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1998), the inequity aversion approach (Bolton and Ock-
enfels 2000, Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and recently  a theory of Social Welfare Preferences 
                                                 
1 See Weibull (1995) or Fudenberg and Levine (1998).  
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(Andreoni and Miller 2002 and Charness and Rabin 2002). In this paper we shall concentrate 
on the last two approaches.  
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) as well as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) introduce concepts of ineq-
uity aversion. It is assumed that there exist people who dislike inequality and who actually 
sacrifice money to reduce it. Both concepts are particularly successful in describing laboratory 
behavior when they assume heterogeneous actors. Bolton’s and Ockenfels’ model is exclu-
sively defined for heterogeneous populations of subjects. Although Fehr’s and Schmidt’s 
model can be used for homogeneous populations, all successful applications assume a mixture 
of inequity averse and strictly egoistic subjects,  the latter being individuals with the standard 
utility functions in game theory. The approaches differ in the concrete definition of inequity 
aversion and Bolton and Ockenfels allow for more general preference distributions of sub-
jects. However, the general version of their model is somewhat more complicated and this 
makes it less suitable for direct application. It thus cannot surprise very much that most fur-
ther applications of the inequity aversion approach use the simpler Fehr and Schmidt variant. 
In the meantime inequity aversion has been challenged by numerous experiments that have 
been carried out (e.g. Kagel and Wolfe 2000 and Charness and Rabin 2002).  
The most recent alternative to inequity aversion has been presented by Charness and Rabin 
(2002). They introduce a model of social welfare preferences with and without reciprocity. 
Social welfare preferences are characterized by individuals who give positive weight to ag-
gregated surplus, i.e. if other people are better off, c.p., utility of individuals increase. The 
authors carried out 32 experiments and compared the compatibility of several social prefer-
ence approaches with the experimental data. Their conclusion is that social welfare prefer-
ences show the best fit to the data. However, the comparison between social welfare prefer-
ences and the inequity aversion model is biased because Charness and Rabin do not take into 
account that the most fruitful version of the inequity aversion model takes explicitly into ac-
count that there are different types of actors, i.e. that there is heterogeneity of preferences. In 
fact, in Fehr, Kremhelmer and Schmidt (2002) as well as in Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2001) 
inequity averse actors are only a minority in the population and the explanatory power of the 
model stems in particular from the interplay of strictly egoistic and inequity averse subjects. 
However, Charness and Rabin (2002) only consider the homogeneous population variant of 
the inequity aversion theory.2 The same critique also applies to their own model of social wel-
                                                 
2 Charness and Rabin (2002) are well aware of this shortcoming as footnote 6 of their paper shows.  
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fare preferences in which they assume a monomorphic population, again. In this paper we 
shall try to show that this shortcoming seriously limits the explanatory power of their model. 
Nevertheless, Charness and Rabin convincingly show that social welfare preferences might 
help explaining quite a lot of behavior in their 32 games.  
Summarizing, Fehr and Schmidt have shown the usefulness of modeling heterogeneous popu-
lation equilibria with inequity averse and strictly egoistic agents. Charness and Rabin have 
shown some evidence for social welfare preferences and the relevance of reciprocity. This 
paper tries to combine these approaches and analyzes whether this increases explanatory 
power significantly. The focus in this paper is on the application of the basic idea. Therefore, 
the basic model has to be sufficiently tractable for direct application in a wide variety of 
games. In fact, we are going to apply the model to 43 different games and show that its pre-
dictive accuracy is clearly greater than that of the isolated models.  
However, the reader should be well aware that the model presented in this paper is regarded 
just as one single step to the development of operational models for explaining experimental 
and field evidence. Its main purpose is to demonstrate the importance of heterogeneity of 
preferences.  
In section 2 we shall introduce a very simple 2 players – 3 types model of heterogeneous pref-
erences with explicit modeling of reciprocity. In section 3 this model is applied to all 2-player 
experiments in Charness and Rabin (2002). Furthermore, its predictive accuracy is compared 
with that of the inequity aversion and the social welfare preference approach. In section 4 the 
model is applied to eight games (each game is analyzed for 2 variants with identical Nash 
Equilibria) from Goeree and Holt (2001). Finally, a summary, some conclusions and some 
thoughts about future research are given in section 5.  
2. Heterogeneous Social Preferences: A Simple Model  
In this section I outline a simple 2 players model with linear objective functions. The main 
purpose of the model is to combine elements of the approaches of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
and of Charness and Rabin (2002) in a rather simple way that allows for direct application to 
2 person games. The main ingredients from Charness and Rabin (2002) are the concept of 
Welfare Preferences and negative reciprocity. The ideas taken from Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
are mainly that there are different types of actors, i.e. there is heterogeneity among the play-
ers, and the concept of inequity averse players. It is assumed that there are three kinds of 
players: strictly egoistic actors (SE actors), inequity averse actors (IA actors) and one type of 
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individuals who has Welfare Preferences (WP actors). It is further assumed that there is in-
complete information in the sense that individuals only know their own types but not the types 
of the actors they are playing with. However, they do know the distribution of types among all 
individuals in their society so that they have common priors about the distribution of types.  
In accordance with Charness and Rabin (2002) we do not explicitly take into account positive 
reciprocity. We assume that all effects of positive reciprocity are represented by IA and WP 
preferences. Charness and Rabin report that they find only little evidence for positive recip-
rocity. Consequently, there is some hope that the neglect of positive reciprocity does not lead 
to high inaccuracies.  
In contrast to positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity is modeled explicitly. If other players 
“misbehave” parameters for social preferences in IA and WP utility functions are changed so 
that players become more “envious” and less generous, respectively. The corresponding util-
ity functions are given by equation (1) 
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i = 1, 2, i ≠ j, t = SE, IA, WP. Here, πi is the monetary payoff of player i. ρt represents player 
i’s concern for player j’s payoff if player i’s payoff is larger than player j’s. σ describes the 
weight that player i puts on player j’s payoff if player j gets the higher payoff. Finally, θ is the 
reciprocity parameter and R is the reciprocity variable which is –1 if the other player has mis-
behaved and it is zero if no misbehavior has occurred.  
Strictly egoistic players (SE) are characterized by 0=== SESESE θρσ , i.e. they just care 
about themselves. Thus, SE players have standard game theoretic utility functions. Inequity 
averse players’ (IA) parameters are characterized by σIA < 0 < ρIA < 1. This means that they 
put negative weight on the other player’s payoff if their own payoff is lower and that they put 
a positive weight on it if the own payoff is higher than the other player’s payoff: IA players 
dislike inequity. WP players always put a positive weight on the other player’s payoff. It is 
assumed that 0 1≤ρ≤σ< WPWP . Furthermore, it is assumed that θ  ≥ 0 for all types.  
The reciprocity variable R is dependent on “misbehavior” of the other player. Therefore, we 
have to define misbehavior. Player i regards player j’s action as misbehavior if j’s action vio-
lates i’s “norm” and if i cannot make sure that his final utility is at least as large as the one he 
would have got if j had acted according to i’s norms. Let us assume that different types of 
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players have different norms. Furthermore, it is important that each player is willing to behave 
according to his own norms if he knows that the other actor follows the same norms. Other-
wise such norms would be eroded quickly. Consequently, norms have to be best responses in 
a game in which the player is playing against another player who has identical norms. As this 
has to be true for both players we can now define norms.  
Definition 1: The norm behavior for players of type t is defined by the (Subgame Perfect) 
Nash Equilibria of the corresponding complete information game (with IA or WP preferences, 
respectively, and R = 0) in which two players of the same type play against each other. The 
corresponding equilibria shall be called “normative reference equilibria”.  
This means that players always follow the norms if they know that the other player belongs to 
the same type of actors as they themselves. However, if they do not know the other player’s 
type they may deviate from their own norm. It is important to remember that deviating from 
one’s norm is only a necessary (but not a sufficient) condition for “misbehavior”. Imagine a 
situation in which actor j has deviated from i’s norm but in which player i can guarantee him-
self an even higher utility than in the “normative reference equilibrium”. In this case he has no 
reason to be angry and to punish j. In such a case it is rather implausible that deviation from 
the norm will trigger any negative reciprocity. To exclude such cases from triggering recip-
rocity we add a maximin condition: Negative reciprocity (R = –1) is only triggered if a devia-
tion from the norm occurs and the maximin utility for player i in the remaining game is 
smaller than his utility in the “normative reference equilibrium”. Otherwise R = 0.  
The existence of different types of players with different utility functions means that the 
games we are going to analyze are games with incomplete information. Therefore, it seems 
natural to apply standard tools of game theory. Let the “material game” be the standard repre-
sentation of a game with payoffs only in monetary units. Then the “heterogenous utility 
game” of the original material game is the extended version of the latter into a game with in-
complete information in which three types of players, SE, IA and WP subjects, with known 
shares in the population exist and payoffs are given in type specific utilities.  
Definition 2: Heterogeneous Social Preferences (HSP) Equilibria are given by the (perfect 
Bayesian) Equilibria of the heterogeneous utility game.  
Note that we have defined IA and WP preferences only for 2-player games yet. Consequently, 
HSP Equilibria according to Definition 2 are also only defined for 2-player games. Although 
extensions to n player definitions are not difficult there are several possible ways to extend IA 
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and WP preferences to more general settings. As this is not necessary for the analysis in the 
remaining part of this paper, such generalizations remain objectives for future work.  
Let us now turn to the 2 players approach, again. In the following sections we shall show that 
this simple extension of the established models leads to a surprising increase in predictive 
accuracy.  
3. HSP Equilibria in the Charness-Rabin-Games 
In this section and in section 4 we will apply the HSP Equilibrium concept to 43 different 
games. The first 27 games are the 2-players games that are presented in Charness and Rabin 
(2002). The remaining games are 8 “treasure games” which confirm traditional Nash Equilib-
ria and 8 “contradiction games” that contradict standard Nash predictions taken from Goeree 
and Holt (2001).  
To be able to derive concrete predictions, we have to make some further assumptions con-
cerning the parameters in the IA and WP utility functions. In their recent papers Fehr and 
Schmidt successfully use σ  and 2−=IA 10 <ρ< IA  to explain laboratory behavior. As we try 
to stick to their IA model rather closely we adopt IAσ  and assume that ρ . To keep 
the analysis as simple as possible and to give reciprocity a sufficient importance assume that 
in case of negative reciprocity IA players always behave as if they had less money than the 
other player, i.e. they put negative weight on the other player’s payoff: 
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With regard to the WP parameters Charness and Rabin (2002) remain rather vague. Although 
they do estimate these parameters – in their estimation with the best fit they get 023.0=WPσ  
and  – the results give us only limited guidance for our approach because they 
assume homogenous actors. However, as there is not a single estimation with  
424.0=ρWP
5.0, >ρWPWPσ
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we regard 0.5 as an upper boundary of these parameters. Furthermore, they assume 
. Finally, to get a qualitative distinction between ρWPWP ρ≤σ
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 and σ  which works out quite well in the following applications. Such a 
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WP expresses the idea of “Welfare Preferences” most closely as it gives equal 
weights to both players’ payoffs. Furthermore, it seems quite plausible that players give less 
weight to the other player’s payoff if they get less money than the other one. With regard to 
reciprocity we assume that in case of negative reciprocity WP subjects behave like SE actors, 
i.e. they are strictly egoistic. This corresponds quite nicely to Charness’ and Rabin’s idea of 
‘concern withdrawal’: “they withdraw their willingness to sacrifice to allocate the fair share 
toward somebody who himself is unwilling to sacrifice for the sake of fairness.” Conse-
quently,  
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Of course, these parameters are rather crude and subjective first estimates which only serve as 
a first step in developing a model of heterogeneous social preferences.  
Finally, we have to make assumptions about the distribution of types. A rough estimate3 of the 
Charness-Rabin games is that strictly egoistic actors amount to approximately 50% of sub-
jects, inequity averse players make up about 15% and the remaining 35% of the players are 
WP actors.  
For the purpose of better intuition about the nature of HSP Equilibria let us first discuss the 
equilibrium in one of the 27 games, game Barc1 (which is identical to Berk13), more explic-
 
3 The “rough estimate” was carried out the following way: First, decisions in the first seven games of Charness 
and Rabin (2002) – which are pure dictator decisions – were determined and then an estimation of population 
shares was carried out. Then equilibria of all 27 games were determined assuming this distribution (with gener-
ously rounded values of the population shares). Next, another estimation of population shares was carried out. 
This procedure was repeated twice. Finally, the population shares were, again, generously rounded so that we get 
prominent numbers as population shares.  
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itly. The game consists of two stages. In stage 1 player A chooses monetary payoffs of 550 for 
both players, (550, 550), or he lets player B choose between (400, 400) and (750, 375).4 If 
R = 0 then the corresponding utilities of the three types of players are given by5 
 USE(R = 0) UIA(R = 0) UWP(R = 0) 
Out 550, 550 550, 550 550, 550 
Enter 400, 400 750, 375 400, 400 468.75, –375 400, 400 562.5, 487.5
 Left Right Left Right Left Right 
Table 1: Utilities in Barc1/ Berk13 
First, we have to determine the “normative reference equilibria”, i.e.the subgame perfect equi-
libria in the complete information game where an IA player plays with an IA player (or a WP 
player playing with a WP player). As can easily be seen, inequity averse B players prefer Left 
and, anticipating this, inequity averse A players thus choose Out. The normative reference 
equilibrium of IA subjects then is (Out, Left). Analogously, B players with WP prefer Right 
and WP-A players choose Enter because 562.5 > 550. The normative reference equilibrium of 
WP players thus is (Enter, Right).  
The normative reference points determine whether negative reciprocity will be triggered. Be-
cause WP players regard Enter as part of their norm and as Out immediately finishes the 
game WP subjects cannot show negative reciprocity in this game. However, inequity averse 
subjects regard Out as the normatively adequate behavior. Furthermore, the maximin value of 
inequity averse B players after Enter equals 400 which is strictly less than their utility in the 
normative reference equilibrium. Consequently, if A chooses Enter this will trigger their 
negative reciprocity reaction. However, in this game utilities of inequity averse players do not 
change if R = –1, as can easily be checked.  
Knowing this, we can determine equilibrium behavior of all three types in stage 2. SE and IA 
actors choose Left and WP subjects choose Right. Given the distribution of the types this 
means that the probability that player B plays Left is 0.65. Next we can calculate expected 
utility of player A choosing Enter. For SE players EU(Enter) = 0.65×400 + 0.35×750 = 522.5 
                                                 
4 The first number in parentheses corresponds to the monetary payoff of player A, the second number to B’s 
payoff.  
5 One can read the following table in the following way, too: In stage 1 of the game: player A chooses a row 
(Out or Enter) and in stage 2 player B chooses a column (Left or Right).  
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which is less than 550, his utility when choosing Out. Consequently, SE players choose Out. 
As can easily be checked, the same is true for IA and WP players. Consequently, the unique 
HSP Equilibrium consists of all A players opting for Out and 65 percent of B players choos-
ing Left. By and large, this equilibrium is confirmed by experimental behavior. In experiment 
Barc1 (Berk13) 96 percent (86 percent) of A players have chosen Out and 93 percent (82 per-
cent) of B players have chosen Left.  
In the same way all 2 player experiments in Charness and Rabin (2002) have been analyzed. 
In Table 2 the structure of all 27 experiments is summarized. P(Enter) (P(Left)) represents the 
percentage of A players (B players) that have decided to let B choose (that have chosen Left). 
The corresponding equilibria are given in Table 3.  
# Name Experiment / Game P(Enter) P(Left) 
1 Berk29 B chooses (400,400) vs. (750,400)  .31 
2 Barc2 B chooses (400,400) vs. (750,375)  .52 
3 Berk17 B chooses (400,400) vs. (750,375)  .50 
4 Berk23 B chooses (800,200) vs. (0,0)  1.00 
5 Barc8 B chooses (300,600) vs. (700,500)  .67 
6 Berk15 B chooses (200,700) vs. (600,600)  .27 
7 Berk26 B chooses (0,800) vs. (400,400)  .78 
8 Barc7 A chooses (750,0) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (750,400)  
.53 .06 
9 Barc5 A chooses (550,550) or lets B choose  
(400,400) vs. (750,400)  
.61 .33 
10 Berk28 A chooses (100,1000) or lets B choose 
(75,125) vs. (125,125)  
.50 .34 
11 Berk32 A chooses (450,900) or lets B choose 
(200,400) vs. (400,400)  
.15 .35 
12 Barc3 A chooses (725,0) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (750,375)  
.26 .62 
13 Barc4 A chooses (800,0) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (750,375)  
.17 .62 
14 Berk21 A chooses (750,0) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (750,375)  
.53 .61 
15 Barc6 A chooses (750,100) or lets B choose 
(300,600) vs. (700,500)  
.08 .75 
16 Barc9 A chooses (450,0) or lets B choose 
(350,450) vs. (450,350)  
.31 .94 
17 Berk25 A chooses (450,0) or lets B choose 
(350,450) vs. (450,350)  
.38 .81 
18 Berk19 A chooses (700,200) or lets B choose 
(200,700) vs. (600,600)  
.44 .22 
19 Berk14 A chooses (800,0) or lets B choose 
(0,800) vs. (400,400)  
.32 .45 
20 Barc1 A chooses (550,550) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (750,375)  
.04 .93 
21 Berk13 A chooses (550,550) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (750,375)  
.14 .82 
22 Berk18 A chooses (0,800) or lets B choose 
(0,800) vs. (400,400)  
1.00 .44 
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23 Barc11 A chooses (375,1000) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (350,350)  
.46 .89 
24 Berk22 A chooses (375,1000) or lets B choose 
(400,400) vs. (250,350)  
.61 .97 
25 Berk27 A chooses (500,500) or lets B choose 
(800,200) vs. (0,0)  
.59 .91 
26 Berk31 A chooses (750,750) or lets B choose 
(800,200) vs. (0,0)  
.27 .88 
27 Berk30 A chooses (400,1200) or lets B choose 
(400,200) vs. (0,0)  
.23 .88 
Table 2: The Charness-Rabin experiments / games.  
P(Left): Percentage that subjects choose “Left”; P(Enter): Percentage that subjects choose “Enter”. 
 
# Name  Player A 
P(Enter) 
  Player B
P(Left) 
 P(Enter) P(Left) 
  SE IA WP SE IA WP   
1 Berk29    [0,1] 1 0  [0.15,0.65] 
2 Barc2    1 1 0  0.65 
3 Berk17    1 1 0  0.65 
4 Berk23    1 0 1  0.85 
5 Barc8    1 1 0  0.65 
6 Berk15    1 0 0  0.50 
7 Berk26    1 0 [0,1]  [0.50,0.85] 
8 Barc7 0 1 1 [0,1] 1 0 0.50 [0.15,0.65] 
9 Barc5 1 0 0 [0,118/140] 1 0 0.50 [0.15,0.57] 
  0 0 0 [118/140,1] 1 0 0 [0.57,0.65] 
  [0,1] 0 0 118/140 1 0 [0,0.50] 0.5714286 
10 Berk28 1 1 0 [0,1] 0 [0,1] 0.65 [0,0.50] 
  0 1 0 [0,1] 0 [0,1] 0.15 [0.50,0.85] 
  [0,1] 1 0 [0,1] 0 [0,1] [0.15,0.65] 0.50 
11 Berk32 0 1 0 [0,1] 0 [0,1] 0.15 [0,0.85] 
12 Barc3 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.5 0.65 
13 Barc4 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.50 0.65 
14 Berk21 0 1 1 1 1 0 0.50 0.65 
15 Barc6 0 0 1 1 1 0 0.35 0.65 
16 Barc9 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.50 1 
17 Berk25 0 1 1 1 1 1 0.50 1 
18 Berk19 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.35 0.50 
19 Berk14 0 0 0 1 0 [0,1] 0 [0.50,0.85] 
20 Barc1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.65 
21 Berk13 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0.65 
22 Berk18 1 1 1 1 0 [0,1] 1 [0.50,0.85] 
23 Barc11 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.65 1 
24 Berk22 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.65 1 
25 Berk27 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.50 0.85 
26 Berk31 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0.85 
27 Berk30 0 1 0 1 0 1 0.15 0.85 
Table 3: HSP Equilibria in the Charness-Rabin games  
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How well do these equilibria explain laboratory behavior? To answer this question we first 
have decide how to handle multiple equilibria. Table 3 shows that in 12 of 27 games there are, 
indeed, multiple equilibria. Of course, some of these equilibria explain behavior better than 
other equilibria of the same game. We analyze three “scenarios: (a) We only take into account 
the “best” equilibria. By this we mean those equilibria that have the smallest mean absolute 
error (MAE) over both the Entry-Out and the Left-Right decision. (b) According to the same 
standard we take into account only the worst equilibria and (c) we separately analyze those 
games which have a unique equilibrium.  
Figure 1 shows the percentage of subjects playing Left or Enter (P_Left) and the correspond-
ing best case probabilities of Left (cases 1 to 27) and Enter (cases 28 to 47) in HSP equilibria 
(Prog_HSP).  
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Figure 1: HSP predictions and laboratory behavior 
Figure 1 seems to indicate that HSP covers the main qualitative features of the behavior in the 
Charness-Rabin games. This impression is further strengthened by some statistical measures 
of predictive accuracy. Now let ( ) ( )( )∑∑ −−−= 222 1 µPLPLPPLR  be the “quasi-
coefficient of determination” with PPL as the predicted probability of choosing Left (or En-
ter), PL as the actual percentage of Left (or Enter) and µ as the mean percentage of Left (or 
Enter) over all strategies. Then R2 = 0.73. Furthermore, the mean absolute error of the HSP 
Equilibrium is MAE = 0.1074.  
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If we take the “best” Nash Equilibrium as an estimator of laboratory behavior predictive accu-
racy is clearly lower (see Figure 2). The quasi-coefficient of determination is even negative 
(R2 = –0.51) and the mean absolute error is much higher (MAE = 0.263). Obviously, Nash 
Equilibria are a rather bad estimator of actual laboratory behavior.  
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Figure 2: Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium prediction and laboratory behavior 
The Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion works a little better than Nash Equilibrium. 
Here we take parameters that the authors use in Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2001) and Fehr 
Kremhelmer and Schmidt (2002), i.e. σIA = –2, ρIA = 0.75 and assume that 60 percent of sub-
jects are SE actors and that 40 percent of subjects are inequity averse. If, again, we take only 
the “best” equilibria according to the Fehr et al. model we get R2 = 0.033 and MAE = 0.22. 
The model clearly works worse than the concept of HSP Equilibria.  
To test the Charness-Rabin model of a population consisting only of (homogenous) WP indi-
viduals we assume that σ = 0.023, ρ = 0.424 and θ = 0.111.6 In addition, for this test we ac-
cept Charness’ and Rabin’s (2002, p. 840) definition of misbehavior, i.e. entry by A is charac-
terized as misbehavior in games 9, 11, 19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 of Table 2. Predictions of 
behavior are determined by the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium given the Charness-Rabin 
                                                 
6 These are the values of Charness’ and Rabin’s best estimate. See Charness and Rabin (2002), p. 840.  
 14
utility function. It shows that the Charness-Rabin model does not work very well. R2 = –1.096 
and MAE = 0.33 are both worse than the corresponding values of the Fehr-Schmidt approach.7  
However, comparing HSP Equilibria with the other approaches seems to be a little bit unfair 
because the existence of three types of actors leaves more room for “intermediate” probabili-
ties of choosing Left or Enter. Therefore, we can carry out another test that does not have such 
a competitive advantage in favor of HSP Equilibria. This is done by counting the number of 
“correct predictions”. By this we mean that one of the two following conditions holds: (a) 
Both the predicted probabilities of Enter (or Left) and the real percentage of Enter (or Left) 
are greater than or equal to 0.5; (b) Both the predicted probabilities of Enter (or Left) and the 
real percentage of Enter (or Left) are smaller than or equal to 0.5.  
It shows that HSP Equilibria are “correct” in 46 out of 47 cases, Fehr-Schmidt predictions are 
correct in 39 cases and Charness-Rabin predictions are correct in 37 cases. Again, HSP Equi-
libria outperform the other concepts.  
Let us now turn to the case where we take the worst HSP Equilibrium in each game. Of 
course, in this case R2 and MAE decrease. However, R2 = 0.19 and MAE = 0.19 are still better 
than the corresponding values of “best” Fehr-Schmidt and Charness-Rabin equilibria. Finally, 
if we only take into account games with unique HSP Equilibria then R2 = 0.698 and 
MAE = 0.13 which are quite close to the case of the “best” equilibria.  
In sum, the concept of HSP Equilibria is able to organize the data for behavior in the experi-
ments of Charness and Rabin (2002) quite well and seems to be clearly superior to Nash Equi-
libria and the equilibria resulting from the approaches of Fehr-Schmidt and Charness-Rabin. It 
remains unclear, however, whether HSP Equilibria do as well in other games that have not 
been created for the special purpose of analyzing social preferences. So let us now look at 
some other games.  
                                                 
7 I also tested the concept of Logit Equilibria (Anderson, Goeree and Holt 1997). In this case R2 = 0.23 and 
MAE = 0.203. Furthermore, I combined the Logit Equilibria concept with the Charness-Rabin model. This lead 
to R2 = 0.2795 and MAE = 0.186. Consequently, it seems that the idea of stochastic game theory helps increasing 
predictive accuracy. However, in both cases the HSP equilibrium still seems to be superior.  
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4. Treasures and Contradictions? An Application to the Go-
eree-Holt-Games  
Recently, Jacob Goeree and Charles Holt (2001) analyzed ten pairs of games. Each pair con-
sisted of two “similar” games with identical Nash Equilibria but differences in the absolute 
magnitude of payoffs. Goeree and Holt showed that in each case in one of the two versions of 
the game Nash Equilibria described laboratory behavior very well (these are called the “treas-
ures”) and that in the other version (the “contradictions”) Nash Equilibria made very poor 
predictions. In this section we shall analyze eight of the ten pairs of games, again.8 We use the 
same parameters of ρt, σt and θt and the same distribution of types as in section 3. It will be 
shown that HSP Equilibria can (partially) solve the puzzle that Goeree and Holt have found.  
4.1. The One-Shot Traveler’s Dilemma Game  
In this section, let us consider the following game: Two players independently choose an inte-
ger number (N) between 180 and 300. If both players choose the same number they are paid 
this amount in money. Otherwise each player gets the minimum of both numbers plus (minus) 
a transfer payment (T) from the player who chose the higher number to the player with the 
lower number. Let T > 1.  
The standard Nash Equilibrium of this game is that both players choose 180. Otherwise each 
has an incentive to underbid the other so that he can get the transfer payment. This Nash Equi-
librium is unique and, furthermore, it is independent of T.  
Goeree and Holt (2001, 1405-6) carried out two laboratory treatments, one with T = 5 and 
another with T = 180. It showed that in the latter case laboratory behavior was close to Nash 
Equilibrium. About 80 percent chose numbers very close to 180. In contrast to this, laboratory 
subjects did not at all behave according to the Nash prediction in the treatment with T = 5. 
Here, even slightly more than 80 percent of laboratory subjects chose numbers that were close 
to the maximum, 300, which is not part of any Nash Equilibrium.  
Next, consider how HSP Equilibria correspond to laboratory behavior. Let us begin with the 
T = 180 treatment. It shows that in this case HSP works as well as Nash Equilibria because 
both coincide:  
                                                 
8 The remaining two pairs of games that deal with incomplete information games are not too interesting here 
because the concept of HSP Equilibria always has the character of incomplete information games anyway.  
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Result 1: The one shot traveler’s dilemma game with T = 180 has a unique HSP Equilibrium 
in which all types, SE, IA and WP actors, choose 180 regardless of their roles as player 1 or 
player 2.  
Sketch of the Proof:  
(a) One can easily verify that no player and no type has an incentive to deviate from the Equi-
librium. Therefore it constitutes an equilibrium.   
(b) Assume that there exists another HSP Equilibrium in which N > 180 is played with posi-
tive probability. Let Nmax be the highest number of the equilibrium candidate that is played 
with positive probability. First, we can easily rule out that it could be an equilibrium that all 
types play the same number N > 180 with probability one as it is always advantageous for SE 
players to underbid the others by one unit. Second, it can be shown that regardless of the 
strategies of IA and WP players underbidding incentives of SE players are so strong that only 
N = 180 remains an equilibrium candidate for SE actors. Third, given that SE players always 
play 180 and that their share of the population is 0.5, it can be shown that no IA player would 
choose to play Nmax with positive probability because they always prefer playing 180 to Nmax. 
Furthermore, it can be shown that expected utility of IA subjects playing N > 180 is always 
negative whereas they can realize a strictly positive expected utility if they choose 180. Con-
sequently, N = 180 remains the only candidate for equilibrium behavior of IA players. Fourth, 
given that SE and IA players play 180, the best remaining scenario for WP subjects playing 
N > 180 gives them an expected utility of 175.2 which is strictly less than 180, the expected 
utility of playing N = 180. Thus, there cannot exist another equilibrium in which N > 180 is 
played with strictly positive probability.    
Let us now turn to the case T = 5. Here we have multiple HSP Equilibria:  
Result 2: In the one shot traveller’s dilemma game with T = 5 there exists more than one 
HSP Equilibrium.   
(1) One Equilibrium is that all types choose N = 180.   
(2) Another HSP Equilibrium contains mixed strategies. Here, WP players choose NWP = 300 
and IA players choose NIA =  288. In both cases players choose their numbers with probabil-
ity one. In contrast to this, SE subjects play a mixed strategy with (rounded) probabilities:   
P(299) = 0.06; P(298) = 0.092; P(297) = 0.0784; P(296) = 0.1077; P(295) = 0.1; 
P(294) = 0.1276; P(293) = 0.1255; P(292) = 0.1527; P(291) = 0.1560.  
The second equilibrium corresponds well to the behavior of subjects in the laboratory. The 
intuition is that WP and IA players play some kind of a coordination game. With T = 5 it is 
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sufficient for WP players that the other WP players choose 300, regardless of how the other 
types behave. In this case they prefer NWP = 300. IA subjects have a very strong aversion of 
getting less than other players. In general they could coordinate their behavior on any number 
that is smaller than (or equal to) SE and WP players’ choices. However, only NIA = 288 makes 
SE subjects that play their mixed strategies (given above) indifferent to all numbers between 
291 and 299. Finally, SE players experience a tradeoff between efficiently underbidding WP 
players (299) and between being underbidden by IA subjects. However, because 288 is suffi-
ciently below NWP = 300 and because WP players have a much larger share in the population 
it pays for SE subjects to risk being exploited by IA subjects. Note that this equilibrium works 
only if T = 5, i.e. it is important for this equilibrium that being underbidden by others is not 
too costly. This is why WP subjects can coordinate on 300 and SE players risk being under-
bidden by IA subjects.  
Summarizing, HSP Equilibria explain laboratory behavior in the traveller’s dilemma in both 
treatments with low and high transfer payments quite well.  
4.2. Matching Pennies Games  
Three variations of a “Matching Pennies” game are the subject of this section. Table 4 gives 
the basic structure of the games in which the players have to move simultaneously.  
  Player 2 
  Left Right 
Top A,40 40,80 
Player 1 
Bottom 40,80 80,40 
Table 4: Matching Pennies Games 
In the symmetric game A = 80, in the asymmetric game A = 320 and in the reverse asymmet-
ric game A = 44. In all three variations there does not exist a Nash Equilibrium in pure strate-
gies. In particular, in the symmetric game the equilibrium in mixed strategies consists of both 
subjects playing each strategy with equal probability. Note that this behavior remains the 
Nash Equilibrium strategy for player 1 in the other variations, too.  
Nash Equilibrium describes laboratory behavior in the symmetric case very well. Here, player 
1 plays Top in 48 percent of all subjects and player 2 chooses Left in 48 percent, too. In con-
trast to this, Nash Equilibrium fails to explain player 1’s behavior in the other cases. In the 
asymmetric game 96 percent of subjects chose Top and 84 percent of players 2 selected Right. 
In the reversed asymmetric game 92 percent of the row players took Bottom and 80 percent of 
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the column players decided to take Left. Nash Equilibrium thus only explains behavior in the 
symmetric game which leads Goeree and Holt (2001, 1407) to summarize: “… the Nash 
mixed-strategy prediction seems to work only by coincidence ...”  
Let us now turn to HSP Equilibria. In the symmetric game we get the following equilibria:  
Result 3: In the symmetric “Matching Pennies Game” all strategy combinations are HSP 
Equilibria which fulfill the following conditions:   
[ ] [ ] [ ] 5.035.015.05.0 =⋅+⋅+⋅ LeftpLeftpLeftp IASE
[ ] [ ]
 and   
[ ] 5.035.015.05.0 =⋅+⋅+⋅ ToppToppTopp IASE .  
For example, if all types mix Left-Right or Top-Bottom with probabilities (0.5, 0.5) this 
constitutes a HSP Equilibrium. The same is true for SE subjects choosing Top or Left and the 
other types choosing Bottom of Right. In any case, the aggregate probability of choosing Left 
or Top must be 0.5. Obviously, this explains behavior exactly as good as Nash Equilibrium 
does.  
Consider now the asymmetric game. In this case column players of type WP have a dominant 
strategy (Left) so that one can derive the next HSP Equilibrium that differs fundamentally 
from the Nash Equilibrium.  
Result 4: In the asymmetric “Matching Pennies Game” there exists a unique HSP Equilib-
rium with [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 1,0,0,1,1,1,,,,,( ) ( )=LeftpLeftpLeftpToppToppTopp WPIASEWPIASE ,   
i.e. all row players choose Top, SE and IA column players choose Right and WP column play-
ers choose Left.  
This means that the equilibrium aggregate probability of playing Top equals 1 (experimental 
behavior: 96 percent) and the aggregate probability of playing Left is 0.35 (experimental be-
havior: 16 percent). In contrast to Nash Equilibrium the concept of HSP Equilibria reacts to 
the payment variation!  
A similar picture can be drawn in the reversed asymmetric game:  
Result 5: In the reversed asymmetric “Matching Pennies Game” there exists a unique HSP 
Equilibrium with  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]( ) 

=
77
57,1,1,0,1,
670
199,,,,, LeftpLeftpLeftpToppToppTopp WPIASEWPIASE .  
Consequently, the aggregate probability that row players play Top equals 0.30 (compared 
with 8 percent in the laboratory) and the aggregate probability of Left is 0.91 (experimental 
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probability: 80 percent). Again, HSP Equilibria explain the main qualitative features of be-
havioral change due to the variations of payoffs. Once more, HSP Equilibrium turns a “con-
tradiction” into a “treasure”.  
4.3. A Coordination Game with a secure outside option  
In this section we analyze coordination games with a secure outside option. However, the 
outside option is dominated by a mixed strategy of Left and Right so that it should never be 
part of a Nash Equilibrium. Table 5 gives the structure of the games:  
  Player 2 
  Left Right Secure 
Top 90,90 0,0 A,40 
Player 1 
Bottom 0,0 180,180 0,40 
Table 5: Coordination Games with outside option 
There are two versions of the game. In the first A = 0 and in the second A = 400. The games 
have three equilibria: (1) (Bottom,Right), (2) (Top,Left) and an equilibrium in mixed strategies 
(3) ( )( ) 

 

=
3
2,
3
1,
3
2,, TopRightLeft ppp . Note that the Nash Equilibria are independent of A. In 
the A = 0 treatment 96 percent (84 percent) of the row players (column players) have chosen 
Bottom (Right), i.e. the strategies for the pareto dominant Nash Equilibrium. 80 percent of the 
subjects managed to coordinate on this equilibrium. This was different in the A = 400 treat-
ment. Here only 64 percent (76 percent) of the row (column) players have chosen Bottom 
(Right) and only 32 percent of the pairs coordinated on this equilibrium. More than 50 percent 
of the outcomes were uncoordinated non-Nash outcomes. Again, Nash Equilibrium was a bad 
predictor for one of the versions (A = 400).  
It turns out that HSP Equilibria in the A = 0 treatment coincide with Nash Equilibria, i.e. in 
the “treasure” version HSP Equilibria do equally well. However, HSP Equilibria in the 
A = 400 version differ from Nash Equilibria.  
Result 6: There are three HSP Equilibria in the extended coordination game with A = 400:  
(1) SE, IA and WP players play (Bottom, Right).   
(2) All types of row players play Top. SE and IA column players choose Left and WP column 
players choose Secure.  
(3) Row players: SE and IA subjects play Top and WP subjects play Top with probability 
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1/21. Column players: SE and IA subjects play Left with probability 442/1755 and Right with 
probability 1313/1755. WP subjects choose Secure.  
The third HSP Equilibrium gives an aggregate probability that players choose Top of 2/3. The 
aggregate probability of Left is about 0.16, the probability of Right (Secure) is 0.49 (0.35). 
Consequently, only about 27 percent of the pairs can be expected to coordinate on one of the 
two Nash Equilibria. Obviously, this estimate looks more pessimistic than the experimental 
experience. Nevertheless it better fits the data than Nash Equilibria.  
4.4. A Minimum-Effort Coordination Game 
This game is a special kind of a team problem. Each of the two players simultaneously 
chooses his effort e and payoffs are determined by the formula { } ijii ceeey −= ,min , i, j = 1, 
2 and i ≠ j. Here c represents a cost parameter that is assumed to be smaller than 1 and cei 
gives individual i’s costs. Each individual gets the output min{ei , ej}. It is straightforward 
that there are multiple Nash Equilibria. In fact, every feasible effort is part of an equilibrium if 
all actors coordinate on the corresponding value. This is true for any  c < 1 and is independent 
from the magnitude of c.  
In the experimental design by Goeree and Holt (2001) efforts could be any integer number 
between 110 and 170. They carried out two treatments, one with c = 0.1 and one with c = 0.9. 
It shows that behavior in these two treatments clearly differs. With c = 0.1 choices of effort 
concentrate near the upper boundary, 170. In contrast to this, most subjects have chosen ef-
forts near 110, the lower boundary, if c = 0.9. Without doubt, both treatments are in accor-
dance with Nash Equilibrium. However, the concept of Nash Equilibrium gives no hints why 
there is so much divergence between the treatments.  
Unfortunately, there are also multiple HSP Equilibria. In fact, if all types coordinate on any 
feasible effort this represents a HSP Equilibrium, too. Consequently, as with Nash Equilib-
rium, HSP Equilibria are in accordance with experimental behavior. This, of course, is not 
surprising because any effort choice is part of one of the many Nash Equilibria of the game. 
Even worse, the behavioral differences between the two treatments cannot be explained, ei-
ther. One might argue, however, that with c = 0.1 the coordination problem is weakened. For 
example, even if all SE and IA players choose e = 110 it is an optimal behavior for WP play-
ers to coordinate on e = 170, i.e. it is sufficient for WP subjects that coordination only be-
tween them is arranged properly. Given that all WP players coordinate on e = 170 it is optimal 
for all SE players to coordinate on 170, too, even if all IA subjects stick to e = 110. Finally, as 
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all types playing 170 is a HSP Equilibrium, IA players would follow the other types of play-
ers. Nevertheless, such a kind of reasoning is not part of the concept of HSP Equilibrium so 
that we have an unresolved equilibrium selection problem.  
4.5. The Kreps Game  
In the previous section we dealt with a game that had multiple equilibria. Every feasible effort 
could be part of a Nash Equilibrium and there was no reliable way to discriminate between 
the Nash Equilibria. In this section Nash even works worse. There are, again, multiple Nash 
Equilibria but for one player the only pure strategy which is not part of any Nash Equilibrium 
is chosen most of the times in one of the treatments. The structure of the Kreps Game is given 
in Table 6.  
 Left Middle Non-Nash Right 
Top 200,50 0,45 10,30 20,–250 
Bottom 0,–250 10,–100 30,30 
I: 50,40 
(II: 350,400) 
Table 6: Two variants of the Kreps Game  
The only difference between the variants can be found in the cell (Bottom,Right). In variant I 
payoffs are rather small and in variant II they are much larger. However, both variants of the 
Kreps Game have two Nash Equilibria in pure strategies, (Top,Left) and (Bottom,Right). Fur-
thermore there exists one Nash Equilibrium in mixed strategies in which the column player 
randomizes between Left (with probability 1/21) and Middle (with probability 20/21) and the 
row player randomizes between Top (with probability 150/155)  and Bottom (with probability 
5/155).  Consequently, only the pure column strategy Non-Nash is not part of a Nash Equilib-
rium in both variants of the game.  
Here, variant II represents the treasure treatment in which 96 percent of the subjects in the 
laboratory have chosen Bottom and 84 percent have chosen Right. So behavior is in accor-
dance with the pareto optimal Nash Equilibrium. However, in treatment I with relatively low 
payoffs behavior of subjects in the laboratory was completely at odds with the concept of 
Nash Equilibrium. 68 percent of the column players have chosen Non-Nash, the only strategy 
that is not part of any Nash Equilibrium.  
In contrast to Nash Equilibrium HSP Equilibrium does not rule out the pure strategy Non-
Nash:  
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Result 7: Variant I of the Kreps Game has multiple HSP Equilibria. One of them is charac-
terized by the following behavior: SE and IA column players choose Non-Nash and WP col-
umn players choose Non-Nash with probability 57/77 and Left with probability 20/77. SE row 
players choose Top with probability 107/140 and Bottom with probability 33/140. IA row 
players choose Bottom and WP row players choose Top.  
According to this HSP Equilibrium, Non-Nash is played with an aggregated probability of 
approximately 91 percent (compared to 68 percent in the laboratory) and the probability of 
Left is about 9 percent (26 percent). The aggregate probability of choosing Top is 73.2 percent 
(compared to 68 percent in the laboratory). HSP Equilibrium thus gives a clearly better pre-
diction than Nash Equilibrium. It should be mentioned, however, that the HSP Equilibrium 
from Result 7 is also valid for treatment II where it is hardly played at all. In addition, note 
that only in variant II there exists a HSP Equilibrium in which all types of row players choose 
Bottom and all types of column players choose Right.  
4.6. Should you trust others to be rational?  
Let us now turn to games in the extensive form. What is of particular interest here is whether 
the logic of backward induction holds reliably. This means that we have to analyze whether 
players who move first should trust their followers to behave rational and whether they should 
believe threats that are not credible. In this section we concentrate on the first question. Look 
at the game in Figure 3 in which the first player has to decide whether to stop the game and 
choose a safe payoff or whether he should let the second player choose between two other 
payoff combinations.  
Player 1
Player 2
S R
P N 
(80,50)
I: (20,10)
II: (20,68)
(90,70)
 
Figure 3: An extensive form game 
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Again, there are two variants of the game. The difference between the variants consists of the 
payoff of player 2 in case of an R-P play. In variant I player 2 looses much money if he 
chooses P instead of N. In variant II payoff differences for player 2 are rather small if he has 
to choose between P and N. In any case there is the same unique subgame perfect Nash Equi-
librium, namely (R,N).  
Goeree and Holt (2001) show that laboratory behavior fits well to the Nash prediction in vari-
ant I: 84 percent of the first movers have chosen R and 100 percent of the second movers se-
lected N. However, things are quite different in variant II. Here only 48 percent of the first 
movers decided to take R and 75 percent of the second movers have chosen N. Although most 
second movers behaved rationally, there are sufficiently many subjects who deviate from the 
rational second move so that it paid on average for the first movers to choose the non-
equilibrium strategy S. Or to put it another way: In variant II the first movers have good rea-
son not to trust the other players to behave rationally. Again, Nash Equilibrium does well in 
one treatment but fails in the other one.  
In variant I, the treasure treatment, the HSP Equilibrium coincides with the Nash Equilibrium. 
Consequently, HSP Equilibria are exactly as successful in this variant as Nash Equilibria. 
However, variant II has a different HSP Equilibrium. 
Result 8: HSP Equilibrium play in variant II of the extensive form game is characterized by 
the following behavior: SE and IA types of the first movers choose S and WP subjects take R. 
The second movers choose N if they are SE or WP types. They prefer P if they are IA actors.  
The intuition for this result is that inequity averse players prefer P to N. The reason for this is 
that they dislike being in the disadvantaged position much more than they dislike inequity in 
their own “favor”.9 Because IA second movers deviate from the subgame perfect Nash behav-
ior SE and IA subjects prefer S as first movers.  
Consequently, HSP Equilibrium predicts that 65 percent of the first movers choose S (com-
pared to 52 percent in experimental behavior) and only 35 percent choose R. Furthermore, 
according to HSP Equilibrium 15 percent of the second movers opt for P (compared to 25 
percent in the experiments). Again, HSP Equilibrium is a better estimator of actual behavior 
than subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.  
                                                 
9 This, of course, is due to the parameters for inequity aversion taken from Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2001) and 
Fehr, Kremhelmer and Schmidt (2002).  
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Finally, note that the section title “should you trust others to be rational” that has been 
adopted from Goeree and Holt (2001) does not really fit to the game when looked upon from 
a HSP perspective. In equilibrium all players behave rationally, so that one can trust in the 
others rationality. However, what the first movers do not know is the motivation of the second 
movers. Consequently, from a HSP point of view the problem considered here is better de-
scribed by the question “should you ‘trust’ others not to be envious?”  
4.7. Should you believe a threat that is not credible?  
In this section we deal with the problem of credible vs. incredible threats. Many Nash Equilib-
ria involve incredible threats that make them rather implausible. For this reason Selten (1965) 
introduced the criterion of subgame perfectness to rule them out. However, it has often been 
shown that subgame perfectness does not always fit to actual behavior very well. Let us now 
look at two games with incredible threats that are represented in Figure 4.  
Player 1
Player 2
S R
P N 
(70,60)
I: (60,10)
II: (60,48)
(90,50)
 
Figure 4: Two extensive form games with incredible threats 
The structure of the games are very similar to those in the previous section. However, in the 
games considered here player 2 dislikes player 1 to play R. The Nash Equilibrium (S,P) works 
only with the use of the incredible threat of player 2 to play P. Subgame perfectness rules this 
out so that (R,N) remains the unique subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium.  
Again, the only difference between the two variants of the game consists of different payoffs 
in case of (R,P) play. In variant I playing P is very costly to player 2 because he looses 80 
percent of his profits. In contrast to this variant II is a game in which playing P only costs 4 
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percent of maximum payoffs for player 2 although this has absolutely no impact on the sub-
game perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game.  
Goeree and Holt (2001) find that variant I is a treasure, again. In their experiments 88 percent 
of the first movers have chosen R and 100 percent of the second movers have chosen N. This 
nearly perfectly fits to the prediction of the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium. Things look 
very different in variant II of the game. Here only 68 percent of the first movers have chosen 
R and only 53 percent of the second movers have chosen N, the subgame perfect equilibrium 
strategy.  
In variant I (the treasure treatment) of the game HSP Equilibria are even more precise than 
subgame perfect Nash Equilibria.  
Result 9: In variant I of the extensive form game with incredible threats there exists a unique 
HSP Equilibrium. Here all types of second movers choose N. First movers that are SE and 
WP types choose R and IA first movers choose S.  
Consequently, the aggregate probability of first movers choosing R is 85 percent (compared to 
88 percent in laboratory experiments) and the percentage of second movers playing N is 100 
percent (compared to 100 percent in the experiments). In variant II of the game we get a dif-
ferent HSP Equilibrium. 
Result 10: The unique HSP Equilibrium of variant II of the extensive form game with incredi-
ble threats is given by the following behavior: SE- and WP-first movers choose R and IA-first 
movers choose S. If second movers are of SE or WP type they choose N and if they are IA-
subjects they choose P.  
This means that 85 percent (compared to 68 percent in the experiment) of all first mover deci-
sions should be R, again, and that 85 percent (compared to 53 percent) of the second movers 
are expected to choose N. Obviously, this prediction is worse than the one from variant I. It 
seems that HSP Equilibrium does not react sufficiently strong to the change in parameter val-
ues. However, it still is clearly superior to the prediction according to the subgame perfect 
Nash Equilibrium.  
Finally, from a HSP point of view the section title which has again been adopted from Goeree 
and Holt (2001) poses the wrong question. It is not whether you should believe an incredible 
threat or not, it is much more the question whether a threat is credible or not, given that there 
are heterogeneous actors.  
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4.8. Two-Stage Bargaining Games  
Bargaining games have always been a very special challenge to economic theory in general 
and game theory in particular. In this section we analyze a two-stage alternating offers bar-
gaining game. In stage 1 player 1 makes his first proposal (x1) about how to split a pie of $5 
and player 2 then decides whether to accept this proposal or not. If the offer is accepted both 
players get the proposed amount of money. However, if it is rejected the pie shrinks to $2 
(variant I) or $0.5 (variant II). In this case player 2 gets the right to propose the split of the pie 
(x2) and player 1 can accept or reject this second offer. If the second offer is also rejected both 
players get a payoff of zero. If player 1 agrees both players get the proposed amounts of  
money.  
This game has the following subgame perfect equilibrium: In stage 2 player 2 proposes that he 
gets all the remaining money but 1 cent. Player 1 accepts this proposal. Anticipating this, 
player 1 offers player 2 an amount of money that is equal to the magnitude of the pie in stage 
2 and keeps the rest for himself. This proposal is also accepted by player 2. Consequently, in 
variant I player 1 gets an equilibrium payoff of $3 and player 2 gets $2. In contrast to this, in 
variant II equilibrium play is characterized by a distribution in which player 1 gets $4.50 and 
player 2 gets $0.50.  
Again, it turns out that experimental behavior in one of the treatments is close to the subgame 
perfect Nash Equilibrium and in the other the equilibrium is a very poor predictor of behavior. 
In variant I, the treasure treatment, the average demand of player 1 is $2.83 which is quite 
close to the proposed $3. In variant II, however, average demand of player 1 in stage 1 is only 
$3.38 which is far below the game theoretical prediction of $4.50.  
In both variants of the game HSP Equilibria do not coincide with the subgame perfect Nash 
Equilibrium. In variant I it is quite close to Nash Equilibrium play, though.  
Result 11: HSP Equilibria of variant I of the two stage bargaining game are characterized by 
the following behavior of player 1: SE types demand $3 and accept any offer in stage 2. IA 
subjects demand $2.5 and accept player 2’s offer in stage 2 if 562 ≤x . WP players demand 
$2.50 and accept any offer in stage 2. HSP Equilibrium strategies of player 2 are given by: 
SE players accept the offer in stage 1 if 31 ≤x  and demand x2 = 2 in stage 2. IA subjects only 
accept the single offer x1 = 2.5 and demand x2 = 2 in stage 2. WP players accept all offers in 
stage 1 and demand 1 22 ≤≤ x  in stage 2.  
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As a consequence, the average demand of player 1 in stage 1 is expected to be $2.75. This is 
even closer to the experimental behavior ($2.83) than the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium 
prediction. The intuition is that IA subjects prefer an equal split. WP subjects also choose this 
particular demand because this makes sure that the offer is not rejected by any type. In equi-
librium play all IA and WP offers are accepted. SE players risk demanding $4.5 because they 
know that only IA actors reject this offer. In addition, IA players who have rejected an offer 
demand the whole pie in stage 2 because of negative reciprocity. This offer, however, is ac-
cepted by SE and WP players. IA players would reject it. However, this never happens be-
cause IA types of player 1 make offers that are always accepted in stage 1.  
Result 12: HSP Equilibria of variant II of the two stage bargaining game are characterized 
by the following behavior of player 1: SE types demand $4.50 and accept any offer in stage 2. 
IA subjects demand $2.50 and accept player 2’s offer in stage 2 if 1032 ≤x
41 ≤x
.0
. WP players de-
mand any amount between $2.50 and $2.70 and accept any offer in stage 2. HSP Equilibrium 
strategies of player 2 are: SE players accept the offer in stage 1 if  and demand 
x
5.
25 ≤
2 = 0.5 in stage 2. IA subjects only accept offers that are below x1 = 2.70 and demand 
x2 = 0.50 in stage 2. WP players accept all offers in stage 1 and demand  in 
stage 2. 
50.02 ≤x
Because of the multiplicity of equilibria given in Result 12 we do not have a unique expected 
value of the first demand in stage 1. The mean demand should be between $3.5 and $3.57 
which is quite close to the behavior in the laboratory ($3.38). As we have mentioned before 
the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium gives a clearly worse prediction of first proposals. The 
difference between the equilibria of variant I and II stems from the more aggressive play of 
SE actors. However, WP players only change their strategies slightly and IA types do not 
change their first offers at all. The latter point explains why experimental behavior does not 
change as much as standard game theory lets us expect.  
5. Conclusion  
The main purposes of this paper are to demonstrate the usefulness of social preferences in 
explaining economic behavior and, even more important, to show that heterogeneity of pref-
erences can play an important role in explaining many deviations of laboratory behavior from 
standard game theoretical predictions.  
For these purposes, we introduce the concept of HSP Equilibrium and show that – compared 
with other well known approaches – it is able to explain behavior of subjects in the experi-
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ments of Charness and Rabin (2002) very well. The idea of HSP Equilibria integrates the 
competing approaches of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002) into a uni-
fied and tractable framework. According to HSP Equilibrium three types of players, strictly 
egoistic subjects, inequity averse agents and subjects with (social) welfare preferences, be-
have according to the corresponding (perfect) Bayesian Equilibria.  
HSP Equilibrium predictions are clearly superior to Nash Equilibrium, the inequity aversion 
model (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) and Charness’ and Rabin’s model of Social Welfare Prefer-
ences. Furthermore, it was shown that HSP Equilibrium can explain most “behavioral anoma-
lies”, the “contradictions”, that have been presented in Goeree and Holt (2001). The overall 
impression is that the analytical combination of social preferences with heterogeneity in these 
preferences is a very fruitful approach to understand real behavior that is observed in labora-
tory experiments.  
HSP Equilibrium also explicitly takes into account negative reciprocity. Although this helps 
to get better predictions in a few games reciprocity does not play a major role in most games 
that have been considered here. Therefore, it remains unclear whether this achievement justi-
fies the resulting analytical inconvenience.  
Finally, the HSP Equilibrium approach is far from being perfect, of course. There still remains 
an uncomfortably high level of “unexplained variation”. So where do we go from here? Pre-
sumably, there are two different ways one may try to make progress. The first one is to allow 
for even more than the three different types that are used in the HSP Equilibrium concept. For 
example, one can add subjects with competitive preferences, i.e. actors who always put nega-
tive weights on other people’s payoffs. The author has tried this procedure. However, it 
showed that the introduction of preferences did not improve the predictive success of the ap-
proach. Furthermore, the more types are integrated the more tedious, i.e. less applicable, the 
analysis becomes. Therefore, the author is quite pessimistic about this alternative for future 
research.  
Another way to proceed is to try to integrate heterogeneous social preferences in the Quantal 
Response Equilibrium framework. In an intuitive appealing manner the proponents of this 
approach, in particular McKelvey and Palfrey as well as Goeree and Holt and their coauthors, 
show that they can explain the behavioral consequences of parameter variations in quite a lot 
of games and experiments. Nevertheless, there is still much room for improvements in their 
framework, too. Consequently, it looks like a natural next step to combine the idea of noisy 
decision making with the approach of heterogeneous social preferences.  
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